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Corporate Legal Times, October 1993, at 1. Making money under these circwnstances will
require a policy of expense reduction.
See Steven Brill, "The New Leverage," The American Lawyer, July/August 1993,
regarding innovative billing practices based on value to clients and results. There is a strong
movement afoot to limit the amount ofattorney compensation in contingency fee cases by linking
fees to the degree of risk actually borne by personal injury lawyers. The contingency portion of
the fee would kick in only after trial and would be based on that portion of the award which
exceeds the defendant's original offer. Peter Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault,
New York Times, February 11, 1994, Section A, Page I. Ifthis or similar approaches achieve
success in bar associations, ethics ruling, or in the judiciary, lawyers should lean more and more to
neutral forums where clients can be seen and heard in a timely fush.ion, barriers to settlement can
be effectively eliminated by neutrals, and value judgments can be truth-tested at an early stage in
the BA1NA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) evaluation process. (Fisher and Ury,
supra note 2, at 101.) Attorneys who doubt the changing attitude of corporate America regarding
obtaining value and results for legal expenditures should consult Corporate Legal Times,
Chicago, Illinois, a national monthly on managing in-house corporate legal departments.
See also Dahlgren, Jennifer, Consulting the Future, ABA Journal, April 1994,
regarding prepaid legal services.
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PROTECTING THE CONSUMER:
BUYER AGENCY IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
by
Robert D. King*

I. Introduction
The single most important investment for most Americans is the purchase of a home.
The decision to buy a home requires substantial financial consideration. Similarly, one who
sells a home must consider the financial consequences. It is inappropriate, therefore, that such
an important financial transaction is in many instances conducted in a manner which is
inconsistent with prevailing notions of agency theory and which does not aocurately reflect the
Wlderstanding ofthe buyer, the seller, and the real estate professional.

The typical residential real estate transaction promotes this inconsistency through the
use of"listing brokers" and "cooperating or selling brokers," the latter of whom are deemed to
be "sub-agents" of the listing broker. 1 In this transaction, the seller designates a broker to act
as his or her exclusive agent in marketing the property. A listing agreement setting forth the
of the parties is executed.2 This broker is referred to as the "listing broker," and is
legally recognized as the agent of the seller in the sale of the property.3 The listing agreement
typically requires the listing broker to place the listing in the local Muhiple Listing Service
("MLS"). TID:ough the MLS, selling brokers learn that the property is for sale and are advised
ofthe conditions and terms ofthe offer to selL The selling brokers who market the property to
prospective buyers are deemed sub-agents of the listing broker and, consequently, sub-agenlS
ofthe seller, to whom they owe a fiduciary obligation.4

The typical real estate sale involves the prospective buyer contacting the sub-agent and
requesting that the sub-agent assist the buyer in locating suitable property that is for sale. The
reviews properties listed for sale in the MLS and presents them to the buyer for
consideration. If the buyer decides to bid on a property, the sub-agent then prepares the
buyer's offer to purchase, often after having counselled the buyer on the purchase bid as
compared with similar properties in the area. As negotiations with the seller over the terms of
the proposed sale continue, the sub-agem often negotiates on behalfofthe buyer.5
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Davis and Newstrom, supra, Fuller supra note 15, at 308, suggests that the mediation is
directed not to conforming to norms, but rather to creating the relevant nonns. Note 31, at 312.

*Professor ofBus.iness Law, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey
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' FISHER AND URY, supra, note 2, at 101.
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The close relationship between the selling broker and the buyer implies that the selling
broker is the buyer's agent. In filet, in a survey conducted by the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), 67% of buyers surveyed stated that they relied on the advice of a listing or selling
broker, including advice concerning the valuation of the property. As might be expected, the
typical buyer assumes that he or she is represented by the selling broker. Approximately 71%
of buyers surveyed in the FTC Report believed that the selling broker was the agent of the
buyer.6 Indeed, the entire selling process, when accomplished through the use of a selling
broker, supports this assumption. In fact, most selling brokers see themselves as representing
the buyer.7 The entire range of activities which transpire from the moment the buyer steps into
the selling broker's office until the buyer is handed the keys to the new residence suggests that
the selling broker represents the buyer.
Notwithstanding the sub-agent's apparent representation of the buyer in identifying,
valuing, bidding for and negotiating with the seller over the property, the selling broker, as a
3
sub-agent, is considered the agent of the seller. This agency scheme is confusing to the
average real estate purchaser and inconsistent with the actions of both the buyer and the selling
broker. Moreover, the seller too is victimized by the sub-agency principle. Sellers who use
due care in selecting a listing broker as a sales agent may nonetheless become liable in tort to
the buyer for any misreresentation of
including the sub-agents about whom the seller
knows litt1e or nothing.
The pUIJX>se ofthis article is to identify the weaknesses in the sub-agent rule; examine
the principal ahematives to sub-agency; and, recommend a form of buyer's agency which will
comport with the realities of the real estate sale process, offer protection to the consumer,
particularly the buyer, and do as little damage to the existing methodology of real estate sales
as posstble.

II. The Weaknesses Of Sub-agency In Residential Real Estate
A typical home sale involves a seller, a buyer, and two real estate brokers: the listing
broker and the selling broker. 10 The contractual agency relationship is created by the seller's
execution of a listing contract. Contained within the agreement is the seller's consent to the
placement of the property in the :MLS. 11 The MLS serves as a quasi-public market for
residential real estate transactions whereby the listing and other relevant information about the
12
property is made available to all brokers who subscnbe to the service.
Moreover,
participation in the MLS by the seller is interpreted as consent to the creation of subagents.13
The listing agreement is a unilateral contract by the seller to pay the commission if the property
14
is sold according to the terms of the listing agreemem.
Without a doubt, it is clear that an :MLS listing benefits the parties to the proposed
transaction. The :MLS listing benefits the seller by increasing the universe of prospective
buyers aware that the property is for sale. Similarly, the :MLS provides exposure to the
maximum number of brokers in the area, assuring that in the event the listing broker is unable
or unwilling to market the property actively, the seller may find another listing broker. The
listing broker benefits from the MLS listing because it better enables him or her to bring an
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offer to buy to the seller within the terms of the listing agreement, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the listing·broker will receive at least some portion of the cormnission. 15 The
.MLS listing procedure also benefits the selling broker by increasing the inventory of properties
available to show the buyer. And finally, the buyer benefits from the broker's affiliation with
the Ml...S since the .MLS provides the buyer wtth a catalog of similar properties in the
having the qualities that the buyer is seeking.
The benefits afforded by the MLS, including the efficiencies related to seller liquidity,
valuation for the buyer and the seller, and the aggregation of inventory from which the buyer
may choose, all suggest that the MLS system should be maintained. It is, however, the notion
of sub-agency cormected to the MLS which needs to be abolished. As one commentary noted,
"Even though theNAR [National Association ofReahors] urges and promotes this subagency
theory, the agency relation between the seller and the cooperating [selling] broker 'bas led to
much misunderstanding and confusion regarding the broker's proper relationship to the buyers
among the general public, the real estate industry, and the legal profession.' It should not be
the law."16
When brokers become members of the MLS they agree to pool listings and share
oorniimsions. Under the NAR framework, placing the listing in the MLS "constitutes an offer
ofsubagency by the listing broker to other [MLS] members to procure a buyer in exchange for
a percentage of the sale commiss.ion."17 In the typical transaction utilizing the :MLS, the selling
broker fimctions as the agent of the listing broker and, thereby, is deemed the sub-agent ofthe
seller. 18 Consequently, both the listing and the selling broker stand in a fiduciary relationship to
19
the seller.
While it is clear to the parties and indeed makes sense that the listing broker is the
agent of the seller and, therefore, stands in a fiduciary relationship to him or her, it is generally
contrary to the beliefs and reasonable expectations of the parties that the selling broker is also
the agent of the seller. As corrnnentators have suggested,
Most buyers and sellers are tmaware of the true legal relationship between them and
the brokers under the MLS structure. The sellers do not understand the listing
agreements and the consent to subagency....Sellers are not infonned to the potential
liability for the conduct ofagents and subagents. The buyer does not know that secrets
revealed may be divulged by the [selling] broker under the legal duty owed to the
seller.20
And further,
[E]ven experienced real estate brokers are not fully aware of the agency relationships
created in real estate transactions, particularly those involving MLS, nor can they be
certain of the extent oftheir duties and liabilities. Ifexperienced real estate brokers are
not sure of their own agency status, the average homebuyer and seller, who may be
involved in a real estate trnnsaction only two or three times during their lifutimes,
probably will not know who represents whom and what respotlSlbilities each bas. 21
21

Bm it is the buyer, who under sub-agency is not legally represented by a real estate agent, who
is the most vulnerable. Virtually every aspect of the relationship between the buyer and the
selling agent suggests that the selling agent represents the buyer. Typically, the buyer, acting as
a principal, initiates the contact with the selling agent and controls the entire venture, and
through b.islher actions manifests an intent that the selling agent act on hislh.er beha1f.22 Among
the actions indicating the buyer's belief that the selling agent acts on hWher behalf are the
buyer's reliance on the expertise and counsel of the selling agent "'ith regard to issues such as
the market value of the prospective purchase, financing terms, inspection and repair
procedures, and the condition of the property. Furthermore, the buyer is often requested to
reveal his/her financial position to the selling agent in order fur the agent to "qualify" the buyer
for financing purposes and to allow the selling agent to select property listings which the buyer
can afford.23 Indeed, buyers often fuel so comfortable with selling agents that they reveal the
highest price they are willing to pay for a property. Clearly, the relationship between the buyer
24
and selling agem suggests that the selling agent is acting on the buyer's behalf.

The continuation of sub-agency as the preferred interpretation of the relationship between the
buyer and the selling broker also avoids the problems created by dual agency. Dual agency
arises when both the seller and buyer are represented by the same agency. 30 Problems of
conflict of interest are immediately apparent. Although the disclosure of dual agency and the
written consent of both principals, the buyer and seller, can ostellSlbly avoid the charge of
conflict of interest, the question remains regarding the benefits to the consumer. As one
commentator noted:

The selling agent's actions also suggest that the selling agent is acting as the agent of
the buyer. As one connnentator noted:

ill. Alternatives to Sub-agency

...the selling agent will locate and show property to the buyer which meets the buyer's
specifications. This action creates the impression that the selling agent is working for
the buyer. Then, once the buyer is interested in a property, the selling agent will assist
the buyer in determining an offer price, provide financing information, and accompany
the purchaser in a final "walk through." Agajn, these actions would suggest an intent
5
on the part ofthe selling agent to act as the buyer's representative?

Notwithstanding the plethora of indications that the selling agent is the agent of the
buyer, the rule of sub-agency holds that the selling agent is the agent of the seller. This means
26
that the broker "owes his principals an obligation of utmost fidelity and good fil.ith." The
element of "good :fuith" includes a legal, ethical, and moral responsibility to obtain for the
principal, the seller, the best bargain and tenns that his/her skill, judgment and diligence can
achieve.27
In spite of the sub-agent rule's apparent shortcomings for the buyer, some
commentators have nonetheless maintained that the rule actually benefits the buyer. The
Colorado Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the buyer is actually protected as <!result ofthe sub-agency re1ationship.28

Since both real estate agents are agents of the seller, the seller may become liable to the
buyer in tort for any misrepresentation of his agent through the ratification doctrine.
Such liability allows the remedy of rescission against the seller. If there is no agency
relationship between the seller and the selling broker, but the agency relationship is
between the buyer and the selling broker, this remedy of rescission is no longer
available to the buyer because the ratification doctrine would not be applicable, and the
29
buyer's only recourse may be a suit against the broker for damages.

22

It's no problem ... if an agency attempts to [represent both the buyer and sellerJ so long
as all parties agree to it. The agent involved simply slips into neutral territory, the finns
say, and becomes a dual
favoring either seller or buyer but just attempting to
bring them together.
Critics of dual agency say that point of view is hogwash, that agents will
knowingly or unknowingly do whatever is necessary to make a deal31

Il
t

The obvious deficiencies in sub--agency began to attract the attention of commentators
during the mid-1980s.32 The typical response to the objection that the sub-agent rule leaves the
seller vulnerable and buyer umepresented was that through disclosure of the workings of subagency to all parties by the sales agents the consumer would be made aware and therefore able
to protect himsel£ The disclosure contemplated can apply to an agent who wishes to represent
more than one party in the transaction notifYing all the parties, or alternatively, an agent who
represents only one party disclosing this fuct to the other principals. Pressure from conswner
groups, primarily, with some help from the real estate industry itself; caused many states to
enact laws to require disclosure by sales agents about whom he or she represents. 33 There is
no uniformity among the
however, with regard to the nature and extent of the
disclosure. Although the majority of states today have mandatory disclosure Jaws, a study by
the Consumer Federation of America concluded that few have disclosure requirements
essential to meet the needs of buyers.34 The Consumer Federation of America proposed a
four-pronged test that every disclosure should meet:
A written staterrient, provided to the purchaser, that explains the relationship
between the agent, the seller and the buyer. If the agent is :functioning as a "buyer's
broker"...that, too, must be explained.
The disclosure must take a standard, prescnbed fonn.... Agents must be
required to provide the disclosure to the buyer at the first "substantive contact."
Substantial contact means any circumstance in which a buyer begins to relate
infonnation abom the type, location or price range of the property he or she desires.
Unwary buyers who asswne that the agent represents them can divulge valuable
tactical infonnation early on, and then be handed a disclosure funn at the clos.ing table-fur too late to be ofany value.
The fonns must be short, simple and to the point. Leneothy, boilerplate forms
rarely get read.
23

interest. A sample facilitator contract fonn prepared by the Greater Boston Real Estate Board
defines the broker's duties as furnishing "'general advice concerning real estate practices and
procedures' and assisting in 'connnunications and negotiation' between the seller and buyer 'so
they can reach agreement between themselves.'"45 Like the criticism of the dual agency, the
946
facilitator approach is criticized as giving "the consumer the worst of all possible worlds.'
However, it is the seller who is deemed to be the biggest loser tmder the fucilitator approach:

Both the buyer and the agent need to sign the discloSW'e fonn, .acknowledging
that the prescribed form was read and 1.n1derstood by the conswner.35
Disclosure, however, does not appear to be the panacea for all the ills suggested by
sul:ragency. As one commentator noted, "...mere disclosure still fiWs to provide the buyer with
adequate representation. "36 Another commentator noted that, "Limiting the disclosure solely
to the agency relationship does not provide the consumer with information about many of the
options available that would be helpful, though perhaps not in the best interests of the broker,
in choosing how to market his or her property or how to locate a home that best satisfies his or
her requirements."37 Practical reality suggests as well that the buyer may simply not
comprehend the significance and consequences that result from disclosure.38Does the average
consumer understand what is meant by the phrases ":fiduciary duty" or "duty to disclose?"39
Moreover, will disclosures s.iroply be lost on buyers who are preoccupied with all the other
issues and paperwork attending the purchase ofa home't0

"You give up the most important legal protections you have" as a seller--a binding
"agency relationship." This :fiduciary role is a major part of the package of services
sellers pay for in their sales commissions. ...Signing a :facilitator agreement means "you
throw away all that" ... but pay the same.47
Buyer's agency or seDer's agency, or a combination ofboth, is the other most :frequently
suggested alternative to sub-agency. Some real estate brokerage firms have recently decided to
43
add formal representation of buyers, or buyer's agency: to their offered services.
Some
commentators argue, however, that this process is akin to dual agency and, therefore, as noted
49
e.arlier, leaves the buyer and seller "vith little or no real benefits. The issue of dual agency
arises most often in these situations when the buyer decides to purchase a listing of the sales
agent's firm Again, the proponents of this process suggest that the potential fur conflict of
interest on the part ofthe agent can be deah with through disclosure. 5°

In response to the wealmesses inherent in sul:ragency, even with mandatory disclosure
of the agency relationships, some commentators have suggested other alternatives which
ostensibly would better protect the consumer and at the same time give legal effect to the
intentions of the parties as manifested by their conduct. Two of the principal alternatives are
dual agency and buyer's or seller's agency.

As the agent of both the seller and the buyer, the dual agent owes each the duties of
loyalty, good fuith and disclosure.4 1 However, since the interests of the buyer and seller are
invariably at odds, it seems impossible for the fully d&:losed dual agent to fully represent both
parties at the same time. Consequently, the dual agent will typically assmne the role of a
neutral fucilitator, providing the parties with the means to obtain infonnation which they may
need to negotiate the tenns of the purchase. The dual agent refrains from giving advice to
either party. Moreover, since the dual agent nrust still reveal any material fucts of which he or
she is aware, the dual agent is not likely to get too involved with either party in order to avoid
the duty to clisclose. The buyer and seller obviously are disadvantaged by this arrangement. As
one commentator noted:

In fact, dual agency appears only to benefit the real estate agents. As dual agents, real
estate agents are now free from some ofthe responsibilities of agency, but are still able
to collect both the listing and sales corrnnissions. Meanwhile, both the buyer and seller
are left to represent themselves. 42
The dual agency practice is essentially the equivalent oftbe "facilitator," "mediator," or
"middleman" approach. Tiris practice allows the real estate agent to stand in the middle of the
transaction and releases the sales agent from the traditional :fiduciary responsibilities toward his
or her client.43 This approach does allow for the even·haOOed treatment of both the seller and
buyer,44 and may even reflect the real nature ofthe real estate agent's efforts, since the real
estate agent is not generally paid unless a sale is consilll1!'l'l3ted.
for example, the seller
rejects a buyer's offer, the agent typically receives no commission. The agent may, therefore,
attempt to persuade the seller to accept the offer even when it may not be in the seller's best
24
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Obviously, :firms that specialize in providing either buyer's brokerage or seller's
brokerage, but not both, avoid the potential for dual agency suggested by the abovementioned. Firms specializing in seller's agency provide essentially the same services as the
seller receives under sulragency. The seller, however, would presumably not be.appointing
sub-agents and would benefit by not being liable fur the sub-agent's misrepresentations and
misdeeds.51 The buyer, on the other hand, is clearly a beneficiary of buyer's agency. Whereas
buyers are 1.n1represented in the typical sub-agency sale process, in the buyer's agency mode the
buyer has an agent representing him or her exclusively. Issues which once were thought to
doom the utility and practicality of buyer's agency, such as the buyer's agent's splitting the
listing agent's commission from the seller and the apparent unavailability of the MLS to buyer's
agents, have been resolved. The :fuct that the buyer's agent may be splitting a commission paid
52
by the seller with the listing agent is no longer viewed as determining the agent's principal.
53
Moreover, the availability of the MLS to buyer's agents as been agreed to by the NAR As
one commentator noted, "In 1976 when the NAR defined the :MLS as a 'means of
disseminating infOrmation,' the California Supreme Court ruled that theNAR couldn't restrict
:MLS access to Realtors." 54 Buyer's agents benefit the buyer by allowing the buyer access not
only to all the homes listed in the MLS (where the buyer's agent will typically split the
commission with the listing agent) but also to homes that are fur sale by owners (where the
buyer's agent may negotiate a fee beforehand with the sellers or arrange for the buyer to pay a
fee). Furthermore, buyer's agents claim that they are free to render an honest assessment of a
home to the buyer since they are not agents ofthe seller.
Ahhough buyer's agency has been touted by connnentators as the wave of the future,55
and most barriers to its implementation have been removed, it bas not to date caught on. Some

25

of the reasons why the idea ofbuyer's agency has not caught fire with the pub!¥; relate to the
fact that the established real estate industry, as represented by NAR, have not been generally
supportive. While the NAR has given some superficial support for the idea of buyer's agency,
or at least has not fotmally attempted to preclude its development,56 in reality, the rank and file
57
in the industry have not been supportive. The so-called "traditionalists" argue that buyer
representation is not necessary since umer the Reahors'Code of Ethics, they must treat both
seller and buyer fairly. Moreover, the traditionalists bristle at the
of sharing
commissions with buyer's agents.58 Buyers too have been slow to embrace the idea of buyer's
rurency. Buyers' reluctance is based, at least in part, on the belief that the agents working with
them are in fuct working for them and looking out for6their interests.59 Also, some buyers may
believe that using a buyer's agent will cost them a fee. Finally, many firms fear losing part of
the market by specializing in seller's or buyer's agency. And, they fear doing both may be a
conflict ofinterest.

°

IV. A Proposal To Integrate Buyer's Agency Into the Existing Mechanism for Real Estate
Sales

Dominance ofthe sulragent rule in the sale of residential real estate today indicates that
the use ofbuyer and seller agency on a large scale basis is not likely to occur. For well over a
decade sulragency has been roundly criticized fur its thllure to protect the consumer.6 l
Notwithstanding the well-deserved criticism, the predominate method for the sale of residential
real estate remains the traditional sub-agent methodology. The buyer remains essentially
unrepresented, although ostellSlbly better informed of his or her inferior status. One of the
princlpal reasons the sulragent rule dominates the industry today is that it is so finnly
entrenched, there is essentially no strong motive on the part of the industry to change it.
Moreover) the buying public continues to labor under misconceptions as to its representation,
or better, lack of representation.62
The only viable avenue for wholesale change in the existing scheme is to effect it
through a process that does minimal damage to the existing structure. This can be
accomplished by recognizing and implementing the intentions of the parties. As noted earlier,
sellers do not truly understand that they are appointing every real estate broker as their agent
when they agree to allow the listing agent to submit their property for inch.;sion in the MLS.
Similarly, buyers do not understand that the agent with whom they have worked so diligently is
legally bound to look out for the interests of the unknown seller. The whole sub-agent process
is artificial and does not comport with the beliefS and expectations of the parties. Since buyer's
agency is now at least recognized as an alternative which can be maintained through the use of
the :MLS, and the NAR no longer requires sul:ragency as a prerequisite to its use, then the
beliefS of the buyer and seller should be recognized. In other words, when a buyer contacts a
real estate salesperson concerning a property advertised in any manner, the buyer should be
able to assume that the agent will be working as the buyers agent. Only with regard to those
listings which are with the agent's own agency should the buyer be infonned, in writing at the
first contact, that the sales agent is the agent of the seller. This fact is most likely what the
average buyer would believe to be the case anyway. Moreover, throughout the interactions
between the buyer and the agent, whenever the agent shows one of the agency's own listings,
26

the buyer should be again informed that the agent is the representative of the
and the
buyer should be advised to seek independent counsel Although there may still be some
instances where the buyer's interests may be compromised using this process, such as when the
buyer reveals a maximum purchase price to the agent and subsequently develops an interest in
an "in house" listing. the buyer can be made aware at the outset or the first contact with the
agent tbat such infurma:tion should be withheld. Moreover, the typical buyer is unlikely to
discuss the maximum price he or she is willing to pay for a property until one has been found
which is of enough interest to consider making an offer. When the property is not an "in
house" listing, the buyer is free to disclose such information to the agent. Clearly, this option,
while not as perfect as the use of a straight buyer's agency, is a vast improvement over the
which makes all sales agents the agem of the seller. While some disclosure
with regard to "in house" listings would still be required, it is much less complex and fur more
sensible for the average buyer to comprehend. Moreover, to utilize the concept of buyer's
agency in this method recognizes the existence ofthe current structure, allows agencies to both
list and sell real estate,
comports with the beliefs and expectations ofthe parties.

and

V. Conclusion

The sub-agent rule, which today remains the primary theory explaining and governing
the relationship among the parties in residential real estate sales, does not serve the .best
interests of consumers and should, therefore, be discontinued. 'While commentators during the
1980s began to criticize the sub-agent rule, powerful forces, such as the NAR, fostered the
continuation of the rule by tying use of the Multiple Listing Services to the establishment of
sub-agency. Due to increasing criticism ofthe sub-agent rule, however, theNAR
more recent years to consider the utility of alternative methods of viewing the relauonship
among the agents, buyer, and seller. The NAR has dropped the two biggest stumbling blocks
to the consideration of other relationships, such as buyer's agency and dual agency. The NAR
does not insist upon sul:ragency as a prerequisite to utilizing the MLS, and it no longer argues
that the seller's payment of a commission necessitates that all who receive a portion are by
virtue of that filet agents of the seller. Notwithstanding the favorable conditions for a
wholesale change in the manner in which parties to residential real estate are legally related to
each other, very little movement has been made away from the rule of sul:ragency. Although
there are munerous factors which may account for this slow progression, a significant fuctor
concerns the :fuct that a movement to buyer's agency exclusively would require a major
overhaul of the entire industry. Moreover, most real estate firms are not willing to limit their
customer base to sellers or buyers exclusively. Consequently, if the customer is going to
benefit from the notion of buyer's agency, then its integration into residential real estate sales
must be effected in a manner which will essentially leave intact most of the existing structures
while at the same time permitting the parties' belielS and expectations to be given legal and
that in the typical residential
practical effect. This can be accomplished by
estate sale the sales agent is the agent of the buyer m all cases except where the buyer IS
interested in pursuing the purchase of a listing from the inventory of the sales agent's :firm. In
the latter case the agent would remain the agent of the seller. While this proposal is not
without some drawbacks, it is asubstantial improvement over the artificial and anti-consumer
sub-agent rule.
27
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